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ABSTRACT 
 
The ex-vessel supply chain for fisheries has been recognized as an important determinant 
of value generation. In recent years, as the retail demand for fresh seafood products has 
increased, many independent fishermen have bypassed thin, monopsonized, or otherwise 
inferior wholesale markets by engaging in implicit or explicit fixed-output contracts with 
consumers (e.g., restaurants, supermarkets, individuals). We investigate the implications 
of this type of market structure for various management scenarios with a simple model of 
resource stochasticity and fishing effort. We show that contracts are associated with risk 
when periodic stock is stochastic, leading to inefficiencies and excess effort in the short 
run when resource conditions are temporarily poor. However, the results suggest that 
bilateral production agreements between fishermen can absolve a significant proportion 
of these inefficiencies, with broader partnership schemes offering further gains. Fishing 
cooperatives – which are often designed to facilitate the joint marketing of fish products – 
are an obvious tool in alleviating the inefficiencies associated with small-scale, contract-
driven marketing. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ex-vessel supply chain is increasingly seen as an important determinant of the total 
surplus associated with fisheries production, as well as the distribution of that surplus. 
For instance, a sizable portion of the rent generation associated with institutional fishery 
reform has been attributed to improvements along this margin (e.g., ITQs have led to 
longer  fishing  seasons,  which  in  turn  have  shifted  product  from  frozen  to  the  more 
valuable fresh market) [1].  
 
Responding to thin or informationally-constrained wholesale markets
a [2] and changing 
patterns in seafood demand, many fishers have begun to bypass the wholesale market 
altogether, instead developing enduring exchange relationships with intermediate or final 
consumers, such as restaurants, supermarkets, and members of the public. This process 
has  been  aided  by  coordination  among  fishers  –  either  organically  or  as  a  result  of 
institutional design (e.g., sectors) [3] – along both production and marketing margins, as 
well as encouragement from Sea Grant extension programs and others in the US [4]
b. 
Benefits to fishers of direct marketing include higher (in general) ex-vessel prices (due to 
internalized  value  generation  and  market  niche  effects),  stable  income,  reduced  cost 
(depending on where consumers are located), and the potential for a broader political 
coalition due to increased interaction with consumers [5]. However, markets exist for a 
reason,  and  there  are  many  hurdles  to  overcome  to  successfully  operate  in  a  direct-
marketing structure [4]. Some of the price improvement is due to the capture of value-
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maintaining  freshness,  processing  of  whole  fish,  etc.  Developing  and  maintaining 
relationships with consumers is time-consuming and requires skills and techniques that 
are potentially far removed from the experience of commercial fishers. In other words, 
there may be need for additional investment in human and physical capital. Further, in 
some  jurisdictions,  there  are  institutional  barriers  (e.g.,  health  and  safety  regulations) 
requiring permitting and legal expertise. Finally, in bypassing wholesale markets, direct 
marketing  constitutes  a  threat  to  those  entities  further  up  the  supply  chain.  In  these 
circumstances, engaging in direct marketing may create tension if the goal is to continue 
to maintain access to wholesale markets [5].  
 
In this paper, we focus on a particular aspect of direct marketing that has not been fully 
investigated. Specifically, we examine how the presence of explicit or implicit fixed-
output contracts might alter both biological and economic outcomes for fisheries in which 
some  participants  engage  in  direct  marketing.  The  traditional  manner  in  which 
economists  model  fishing  behavior  is  through  the  lens  of  profit  maximization  and 
aggregate  effort  adjustment.  Fishers  are  assumed  to  maximize  profits  subject  to 
technological  constraints,  and  enter  or  exit  the  industry  based  on  profitability.  Non-
equilibrium models of stochastic resource growth are more explicit in their treatment of 
periodic fishing behavior. For instance, Reed [6] and a number of subsequent authors 
consider  a  fishery  in  which  participants  face  an  infinitely-elastic  demand  curve  in  a 
discreet-period setting. It is assumed fishing will continue until the biomass-dependent 
unit cost of fishing is equal to price. This structure leads to a “constant escapement” 
strategy, whereby the optimal (socially and privately) periodic harvest is a linear function 
of  the  observed  periodic  stock.  This  modeling  strategy  relies  on  the  assumption  that 
fishers are able to adjust harvests at the margin, and that there are no countervailing 
incentives. We utilize this model, and posit that if some fishers engage in fixed-output 
contracts,  there  may  be  instances  in  which  contract-maintenance  incentives  dominate 
immediate profitability calculations, which could lead to short-term over-exploitation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop a simple theoretical model 
of fishery exploitation in a patchy environment. We then parameterize the model and 
simulate fishery outcomes using the NetLogo agent-based modeling software package
c. 
This work is very preliminary, and thus our goal is not to make definitive statements 
regarding the effects of output contracts on resource exploitation, but simply introduce 
our basic methodology. In this light, we provide some discussion of results, and conclude 
with caveats and a description of future research goals.  
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
We assume a fishery is prosecuted by 𝑖 = 1,2,…,𝑛 fishers in discrete periods. At the 
beginning  of  each  period 𝑡 = 1,2,…,∞,  the  resource  stock 𝑥  is  distributed  randomly 
across  𝑛  patches  –  each  of  which  corresponds  to  a  unique  fisher  –  such  that 
𝑥  ~𝑁 𝑥,𝜎  .  Shaefer  harvesting  technology  is  assumed  in  the  form ℎ   = 𝑞𝑥  𝑧  , 
where 𝜏 is  used  to  index  instantaneous,  intra-period  harvests  and  stock, 𝑧    is  an 
aggregate  effort  variable  with  constant  marginal  cost 𝑐,  and 𝑞 is  the  catchability IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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coefficient. As harvests, ℎ  , remove biomass from each patch over a given period, stock-
dependent costs increase such that total period harvest costs are given by 
 
𝑐
𝑞𝑠 
d𝑠
   
       
  (Eq. 1) 
In  period 𝑡 = 1,  fishers  are  classified  as  either  “wholesale”  or  “contract.”  Wholesale 
fishers face a perfectly-competitive market with perfectly elastic demand at a price of 𝑝 . 
Contract fishers are assumed to engage in fixed-volume contracts to directly supply their 
product  to  consumers  (i.e.,  restaurants  and  retail  markets).  Bypassing  the  wholesale 
market allows contract fishers to command a higher price, 𝑝  > 𝑝 ; however, they must 
meet their contracted quota, ℎ, to maintain the contract in future periods. If a contract 
fisher fails to meet the contract in a given period, the contract is automatically cancelled 
for all future periods, and the fisher reverts to the wholesale market. Contract fishers earn 
𝑝  for ℎ   ∈ 0,ℎ  and 𝑝  for ℎ   > ℎ.  In  the  simplest  case,  we  assume  the  harvest 
contract is structured so that ℎ = 𝑥 −
 
   ; that is, contracts are designed so that when 
patch stock is “average,” the contract yields the profit maximizing periodic harvest that 
would have been chosen by fishers facing 𝑝  but without a contract. 
 
Define “escapement,” 𝑒   = 𝑥   − ℎ  , as the stock left in patch 𝑖 by a profit-maximizing 
fisher. Periodic profits for the wholesale fisher are  
 
𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝  = max
   
𝑝  𝑥   − 𝑒   −
𝑐
𝑞𝑠 
d𝑠
   
   
  (Eq. 2) 
We ignore density-dependent growth, yielding  
 
ℎ  
  = 𝑥   −
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
   
 
𝑖𝑓 ﾠ𝑥   >
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
0 𝑖𝑓 ﾠ𝑥   ≤
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
  (Eq. 3) 
as  the  optimal  harvest  for  the  wholesale  fisher.  Fishers  with  a  non-binding  supply 
contract with consumers will follow a similar rule, with 𝑝  replacing 𝑝  for ℎ   ≤ ℎ. The 
harvest functions for the two groups are depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Harvest choices as a function of realized stock. This figure assumes 
contract fishers are not required to meet fixed output contracts. 
 
The discontinuity in the high-price harvest function results from the assumption that the 
high price only applies to harvests up to the quota amount. Contract fishers only find it 
profitable to supply additional product to the wholesale market when realized stock is 
exceptionally high.  
 
To  evaluate  the  effect  of  a  binding  contract  on  the  decisions  of  contract  fishers,  we 
restrict foresight to a single future period. When contract fishers experience 𝑥   < 𝑥, they 
must decide whether to meet their quota or default. The cost of meeting the quota when 
𝑥   < 𝑥  is  equal  to  𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝  − 𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝 ,ℎ > 0 ,  and  the  benefit  is  equal  to 
𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝  = 𝗿 𝜋 𝑥,𝑝  − 𝜋 𝑥,𝑝  , or the gain in expected profit next period associated 
with the contract
d. With these restrictions, there are four possible outcomes for contract 
fishermen:  harvest  nothing  and  default,  harvest  less  than ℎ and  default,  harvest ℎ,  or 
harvest more than ℎ. These outcomes correspond to the following conditions: 
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ℎ  
  =
0 𝑖𝑓 ﾠ ﾠ −𝜋
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
,𝑝 ,ℎ > 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝 
𝑥   −
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
   ﾠ
 ﾠ 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝  − 𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝 ,ℎ > 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝   ﾠ𝑎𝑛𝑑 ﾠ𝑥   >
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
ℎ 𝑖𝑓 𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝  − 𝜋 𝑥  ,𝑝 ,ℎ ≤ 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝   ﾠ𝑎𝑛𝑑 ﾠ 𝑥   − ℎ <
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
𝑥   −
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
  
𝑖𝑓 ﾠ𝑥   − ℎ >
𝑐
𝑝 𝑞
 
 
In the first case above, 𝑥   =
 
   , meaning the stock is so low it is not profitable to 
harvest anything this period, even at the high price. Further, the loss associated with 
meeting  the  contract  is  insufficient  to  cover  the  expected  next-period  benefits  of 
maintaining the contract, 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝  . In the second case, the contract fisher defaults, but 
finds some positive harvests to be optimal. In the third case, it is advantageous to fulfill 
the contract, but not profitable to supply additional product to the wholesale market. The 
transition from the second to third cases is denoted by point A in Figure 2, and represents 
the point at which the costs of maintaining the contract – in terms of forgone current-
period profits – are exactly equal to the next-period benefits. Finally, in the fourth case 
the  stock  is  so  large  that  not  only  is  the  contract  filled,  but  additional  harvests  are 
supplied to the lower-price wholesale market. 
 
.   	 ﾠ
 
Figure 2. Harvest choices as a function of stock for fishers with contracts. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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The inefficiency of contracts is represented by the area between point A and 𝑥. When 
realized stock falls between these two points, ℎ > 𝑥   −
 
   , and meeting the contract 
requires fishing the stock down below 
 
   . This result is similar to that which we would 
expect if fishers engage in “revenue targeting,” which can lead to negative labor supply 
elasticities in the short run [6,7].  
 
The  model  above  can  be  examined  to  suggest  a  number  of  outcomes  regarding  the 
inefficiency  introduced  by  contracting  (i.e.,  contract  fishers  fishing  beyond  their 
“optimal” level for the purpose of maintaining a contract). As mentioned above, this 
inefficiency  will  grow  as  A  falls.  The  value  of  A will  fall  as 𝑝  (the  contract  price) 
increases. In this circumstance, the benefits of maintaining the contract, 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝  , will 
increase, and the costs of meeting the contract in a “low-stock” period will fall. Likewise, 
as 𝑝  increases, 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝   will fall and A will rise. A will also rise with the discount rate, 
as contract fishers assign less value to profits next period. As the cost of effort rises, or 
the catchability coefficient falls, unit costs of fishing will rise more rapidly as stock is 
drawn down in a given period, which will both increase the cost of meeting the contract 
in  a  “low-stock”  period,  and  reduce 𝐵 𝑝 ,𝑝  ,  thereby  leading  to  an  increase  in  the 
critical point A. Finally, as 𝜎 (the standard deviation of the normally-distributed random 
stock  variable)  increases,  we  would  expect  contracts  to  lead  to  more  inefficiency; 
however, that relationship is likely non-monotonic, and also does not account for the 
possibility that there is a relationship between resource variability and the likelihood of 
fishers engaging in contracts in the first place. In the next section, we parameterize our 
simple model and simulate fishery outcomes. 
 
SIMULATION OF FISHERY OUTCOMES  
 
To evaluate the impact of contracts on fishery outcomes, we utilize the NetLogo agent-
based  modeling  (ABM)  software  package.  Agent-based  modeling  is  a  useful  way  to 
model complex systems in which a number of individual “agents” interact with each 
other  and  their  environment.  Models  are  structured  from  the  bottom  up,  with  agents 
assumed to act according to a well defined set of rules. While our model is simple enough 
to be run in excel or other statistical packages, the goal is to gradually impose further 
complexity that will, we believe, not allow for analytical solutions. Figure 3 offers a 
snapshot of the NetLogo interface
e. 
 
In the most basic model, fishers are the agents, and they interact with their environment 
but not with each other. In each period, fishers are randomly assigned to patches in a grid 
containing a locally-exclusive, randomly drawn (from normal distribution) stock of fish, 
and harvest under three scenarios: wholesale price, contract price (up to quota) without 
contract, and contract price with contract. In other words, our model essentially assumes 
𝑛  different  fisheries,  each  prosecuted  by  a  single  fisher,  with  stochastic  stock 
regeneration that is independent of local or aggregate fishing effort. Our parameterization 
is provided in Table I. 
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Table I. Parameterization for the basic model. 
	 ﾠ
Parameters 
    Grid size 
# fishers/patches 
33x33 
1,089 
    Economic   
    c  150 
q  0.001 
p
h  3 
p
l  2 
r (interest rate)  0.05 
𝗿  0.9524 
    Biological   
    𝑥  100,000 
𝜎 (standard deviation)  15,000 
     
The result of this parameterization is ℎ = 50,000 and ℎ  
  = 25,000. In other words, in an 
“average”  period,  the  contract  fishers  will  harvest  half  the  stock,  and  the  wholesale 
fishers will harvest a quarter. Further, point A in Figure 2 occurs at 𝑥   = 72,490, or 
when  realized  stock  is  approximately  27.5%  below  average.  When 𝑥   < 72,490, 
contract fishers find the cost of meeting the contract to outweigh the benefits. When 
𝑥   < 50,000, contract fishermen harvest nothing (𝑥   < 75,000 for wholesale fishers). 
Given the numerical solution for A, we can estimate that approximately 3.5% of contract 
fishers will default (z-score of -1.83). 
 
We are interested in evaluating the extent to which contracts might undermine biological 
and/or economic outcomes in the fishery. For this reason, we primarily focus on harvest 
and  escapement  outcomes  between  contract  fishers  and  non-contract  fishers  with  the 
contract  pricing  structure.  For  each  randomly-stocked  patch  in  each  iteration,  we 
calculate expected escapement and harvest under the low price, the high price, and the 
high price with the contract
f. We also count the number of “defaults” in each iteration 
that would have occurred if all 1,089 fishers were under contract. 
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Figure 3. The NetLogo interface. The left side of the screen contains parameters and 
outcomes of interest, while the right side displays a simulated landscape of stock 
values. Lighter colors are less dense, and darker colors are more dense. Above the 
right side is a “ticks” box, which represents the iteration count. 
A  few  numerical  results  are  worth  pointing  out.  First,  our  model  does  converge 
numerically to confirm our assertion of 3-4% of stock realizations resulting in default. 
Second, the average additional harvest associated with binding contracts is approximately 
10%  (49,000  vs.  45,500  for  high-price,  non-contract  fishers).  Contracts  are  also 
associated with reduced profit, on average ($40,000 vs. $45,000), but still dramatically 
outperform average low-price profits of $6,800, per period. 
 
Examining the results of this model also reveals how fishers might manage some of the 
risk  associated  with  direct  marketing.  For  instance,  our  assumption  of  uncorrelated 
resource uncertainty suggests bilateral partnerships would always offer efficiency gains, 
so long as those partnerships are of the contract-contract or contract-wholesale variety. 
Wholesale-wholesale partnerships offer no gains, as fishing technology/skill is identical 
across  individuals.  We  can  also  posit  that  contract-wholesale  partnerships,  whereby 
fishers with contracts partner with wholesale fishers to supply product when own-patch 
conditions are poor, will generally offer greater efficiency gains than contract-contract 
partnerships, as the opportunity cost of sub-contracting in the latter is higher. Finally, it is 
straightforward to show that ITQs represent a limiting case of the partnership scheme, in IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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which  all  fishers  are  partners  (i.e.,  part  of  a  cooperative  with  and  output-sharing 
arrangement). 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
This paper has introduced a basic model of output contracts for seafood products. As with 
many other industries, the fishing industry has begun to take advantage of increasing 
demand for locally produced, sustainable products by contracting with end consumers 
directly. This process of “direct marketing” is furthered, in some circumstances, by the 
“thin” nature of many seafood markets, for which there are only a few wholesale buyers 
and/or  limited  transaction  information,  thus  leading  to  unfavorable  wholesale  pricing 
structures.  However,  in  bypassing  the  wholesale  market,  fishers  may  be  taking  on 
resource  risk  that  is  traditionally  mitigated  by  the  increased  liquidity  of  wholesale 
markets. Specifically, our model assumes fishers must meet output “contracts,” and that 
if those contracts are not met, they automatically revert back to the wholesale market. 
 
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions
g. Regarding resource dynamics, we 
have ignored any stock effects associated with harvesting. This is clearly unrealistic for 
most resources (although some crop species, such as shrimp, may only experience very 
weak stock effects). Further, we have assumed the stock is not correlated across patches, 
or across time within patches, and we have ignored the possibility of an overarching 
stock uncertainty; that is, the expected value of the stock in each patch is equal to 𝑥. We 
have implicitly assumed a homogeneous product, whereas there is evidence some direct 
marketers cater to customers that require a higher-than-average product quality [4,5]. 
Regarding  fishing  behavior,  we  have  assumed  fishers  are  risk-neutral.  While  there  is 
evidence  suggesting  fishers  may  in  fact  be  either  risk-averse  or  risk-loving  (perhaps 
validating  our  assumption),  risk-neutrality  in  this  context  leads  to  a  more  salient 
secondary assumption; namely, that contracts will be structured so that in an “average” 
period,  the  contracted  harvest  quantity  coincides  with  the  profit-maximizing  level  of 
production. It seems reasonable that many fishers would instead prefer to contract for a 
quantity lower than what they expect to harvest in an average period, to avoid the risk 
associated with a particularly deleterious stock realization. We have also assumed fishers 
only consider two periods when making decisions about meting contracts. This means the 
cost of losing a contract indefinitely is artificially low, as one would expect fishers would 
capitalize contract benefits from multiple future periods when making decisions. On the 
other hand, we have assumed that not meeting the contract results in a permanent loss of 
the contract, also unrealistic. We have also neglected to consider the important issue of 
the cost of contracting. As mentioned in the introduction, there are significant logistical 
hurdles involved in successfully direct-marketing. These include the need for potentially 
significant investments in human and physical capital related to the establishment and 
maintenance of client accounts, integration of value-added processes typically handled by 
wholesalers,  processors,  and/or  distributors,  and  navigation  of  administrative  and 
regulatory hurdles. It is likely the majority of these costs are fixed in nature, and it is not 
clear how, ex ante, these would impact the model presented here.  
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Near-term extensions to this model include the introduction of “meta-stock” dynamics, in 
which aggregate fishing pressure impacts the growth or deterioration of 𝑥, as well as  an 
explicit consideration of spatial resource dynamics, in which local patch stock is both 
path-dependent and subject to diffusion processes among adjacent patches, in the spirit of 
[8]. On the economic side of the model, we plan to model a constrained market for 
contracts,  in  which  lost  contracts  are  picked  up  by  fishers  from  the  wholesale  pool. 
Further,  we  plan  to  more  closely  examine  the  assumptions  regarding  the  contracted 
harvest quantity. To evaluate the potential for fishers to manage the risk associated with 
harvest  contracts  (and  the  implications  of  this  type  of  incentive  structure  for  fishery 
management) we plan to evaluate a number of regulatory structures, including a system 
of ITQs, randomly assigned partnerships, and spatial management. Finally, we hope to 
calibrate the model to a specific fishery that has a measurable degree of direct contracting 
activity in an effort to determine the relative importance for resource outcomes. 
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a For our purposes, we use the term thin to describe wholesale markets characterized by 
wholesaler market power and/or small numbers of buyers/sellers. For instance, Wilson  
shows that the theoretical efficiency of the New England fresh fish market is seriously 
undermined by slow dissemination of information and other informational and market 
failures, leading to long-term bilateral arrangements between fishers and wholesalers. 
b  See  https://afs.confex.com/afs/2010/webprogram/Session1108.html  for  a  list  of 
abstracts  from  a  2010  American  Fisheries  Society  conference  session  on  local/direct 
marketing of seafood, and http://www.localcatch.org/resources.html for an overview of 
community supported fishery (CSF) programs. 
c The software is freely available at: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/ . 
d Since profits are a linear function of harvests, and harvests are a linear function of stock, 
expected profit is equivalent to profit at expected stock 𝑥. 
e To request a copy of our code, please contact Steve Scott. 
f Note that due to the non-interactive nature of the model as presented here, an iteration in 
the model can be thought of as 1,089 random draws. 
g We focus on those that are related to our specific model or otherwise depart from the 
literature. 